Abstract: MacPherson liberated the common law of negligence in the United States from its traditional constraints and helped better protect victims of defective products regardless of privity of contract. It made its way to other common law jurisdictions-United Kingdom and Australia-where the same result was achieved. MacPherson, however, never made its way to the civil law world-France and Germany-because these jurisdictions did not need it, given that privity of contract was never an obstacle there. The courts upheld products liability suits in the late nineteenth century on the basis of presumed negligence or even strict liability, thus going even beyond what MacPherson achieved.
Introduction
A century after Judge Cardozo's pronouncement in MacPherson v. Buick, 1 U.S.
courts still follow its rule, and the legacy of this seminal decision endures. In his 1921 lecture series, Judge Cardozo suggested that courts should not stick to precedents that contradict a changed sense of justice or social welfare. 2 Whether changes of that nature occurred or not, the MacPherson rule is still complied with. By abolishing the doctrine of privity of contract, 1916
MacPherson has stood the test of time in the United States. Even more, its influence has extended throughout the common law world.
This influence however did not go beyond. As privity of contract never came to existence in civil law jurisdictions, MacPherson was of no use there. As lawsuits started to come up, German and French law, for example, immediately offered victims of a defective product a remedy based on the manufacturer's negligence, which courts were willing to presume-thereby effectively giving victims the benefit of strict liability regimes. At no point in time was there a need to get rid of the contract shield that Winterbottom v. Wright 3 had imposed in the common law world at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We will leave it to others to explain why the common law remained attached to its reductive approach to negligence and its nominate torts for so long. 4 It is worth noting, however, that even late nineteenth century German law, quite friendly to entrepreneurs' interests, provided a tort remedy to victims of defective products regardless of a contractual relationship with the manufacturer. A landmark decision by the Reichsgericht in 1915 made that conception very clear.
5
As Judge Cardozo was a voracious reader of all sorts of European scholarship, it is in fact quite possible that he was aware of this decision and that he found there some inspiration. It would be quite interesting to find evidence to confirm this influence, but so far we have not found any.
In an effort to assess the place of MacPherson beyond the United States, this article does not intend to take part in the discussion about the kind of duty of care that MacPherson gave rise to-whether universal, as the prevailing view sees it 6 or instead essentially relational, as Goldberg and Zipurski argue. 7 Instead, considering the socio-economic and judicial context, in Part 2 it chooses to focus on how the MacPherson opinion allowed the field of products liability law to develop after it prompted the abandonment of privity of contract and provided for the availability of negligence to third parties. Part 3 then describes the influence of MacPherson on foreign law and shows how MacPherson traveled to the United Kingdom and Australia. It also shows why MacPherson was of no use in the civil law jurisdictions where privity of contract had never seen the light of day. Based on this, Part 4 offers a brief outline of what a comparative analysis of the different laws presented in this article could explore.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Prior to the MacPherson decision, a plaintiff injured by a defective product could only sue the manufacturer for negligence if she was in privity of contract with the manufacturer. 8 It is true that this limitation did not hold for all products. For imminently dangerous ones, courts had recognized a duty of the manufacturers to protect strangers' physical integrity. 9 Under this exception, the manufacturer of an imminently dangerous product could be held liable, on the ground of negligence, for injury caused by the product, regardless of who the victim was. 10 For the rest, however, the privity of contract doctrine remained intact for over eighty years.
The following analysis, first, will provide a brief sketch of the law before MacPherson (2.1) and secondly, analyze how, under the pressure of industrialization and mass production, the New York Court of Appeals decided to change it (2.2).
The insulation of manufacturers from liability before MacPherson
Before 1916, manufacturers in the United States were essentially insulated from liability vis-à-vis victims of their defective products. The same was true in all
Palsgraf as 'Transsystemic' Tort Law, 6 J. COMP. L. 243 (2012). In turn, this difference also reminds one of the duty of care as defined by German law as opposed to French law, which espouses a broad general conception of care. See FRANZ WERRO, LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 95, 2d ed. 106 (2011). 8 See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (holding that persons injured by negligently made products or negligently provided services could not recover for those injuries if they were not the immediate purchaser of the product or service). 9 See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (adopting a first exception to the privity of contract rule-the imminently dangerous product exception.). 10 See id. at 409-10.
Is MacPherson: Civilian Legacy?
other common law jurisdictions. In theory, this insulation did not extend to contractual partners, but in effect the reality was different. Although manufacturers were contractually liable to retailers for the defectiveness of their products, the latter had no incentive to sue unless sued by an injured plaintiff buyer or physically harmed themselves, 11 which was unlikely to occur because in most cases they sold the products and did not use them.
12
This liability shield was only put into question where retailers could bring an action for indemnity against a manufacturer. This was the case, for example, in Iowa. 13 Even then, however, the court emphasized that the manufacturer could contest the validity of the judgment obtained by the victim against the retailer if it was not given notice of the previous case-evidencing once more the barrier to recovery from manufacturers of defective products. 14 This clearly favored their interests as industrialization and mass production were growing. Manufacturers enjoyed the vacuum of the law to innovate without much risk of liability. Manufacturers, however, were not the only beneficiaries of this rule. Judges benefitted as well. In an era of mass production, it insulated courts from the potentially vast amount of "relatively unmanageable defect claims." 15 The privity of contract rule offered a way to keep the floodgates shut and the doors open to the market. 16 However, by the late nineteenth century the negative impact of the losses of victims of defective products had outgrown the benefits of the rule, and pressures to replace it had been building. The defendant is a manufacturer of automobiles. It sold an automobile to a retail dealer. The retail dealer resold to the plaintiff. While the plaintiff was in the car, it suddenly collapsed. He was thrown out and injured. One of the wheels was made of defective wood, and its spokes crumbled into fragments. The wheel was not made by the defendant; it was bought from another manufacturer. There is evidence, however, that its defects could have been discovered by reasonable inspection, and that inspection was omitted. With this clear and simple recitation of the facts, it appeared that the only bar to recovery was what might seem to be an unjust and arbitrary privity of contract rule. 23 At this point, the Court of Appeals had to attempt to fit these simple facts into the "imminently dangerous" exception as the law stood before MacPherson or to expand the exception. Judge Cardozo chose the latter; and it was by expanding the "imminently dangerous" exception that the Court of Appeals managed to extinguish the privity of contract requirement. Indeed, the Court of Appeals held that:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. … There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. [W]henever one person supplies goods, or machinery, or the like, for the purpose of their being used by another person under such circumstances that every one of ordinary sense would, if he thought, recognize at once that unless he used ordinary care and skill with regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode of supplying it, there will be danger of injury to the person or property of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as to the condition or manner of supplying such thing.
Id. at 510. and a coffee urn 43 were dangerous things, another court dismissed a case involving a vehicle that had a defective door handle. 44 Given the flexibility of the MacPherson holding, however, it provided courts with discretion in deciding whether to require privity of contract or not. Over time, the exception appeared so broad that it became the obvious rule of liability, and in effect, the privity of contract rule disappeared.
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3 Influence on foreign products liability law
During a period of mass production, where many consumers were victims of defective products and many jurisdictions struggled with the consequences, MacPherson naturally served as an example of an adequate approach to provide victims with redress for manufacturers' wrongs. This exemplary role was useful in the common law world (3.1) It served no purpose in the civil law jurisdictions though, where courts did not have to overcome the doctrine of privity of contract and where manufacturers of defective products were held liable when negligent (3.2). contract with the seller of the ginger beer, asserted that the manufacturer had been negligent and that he should had a duty to keep such foreign bodies out of his products. 53 The manufacturer argued that even if he had been careless, he owed her no legal duty of care. 54 Ms. Donoghue won her claim.
In the common law
The case has come to be celebrated as laying the groundwork for the modern U.K. tort of negligence; the first one to establish a general principle of negligence based liability. 55 Usually the applicability of a case as an authority is limited by its facts. 56 Donoghue is an exception to that rule. This is because Lord Atkin recognized that he was articulating a principle-the famous "neighbor principle": This principle was broad enough to extend its authority beyond the facts of Donoghue. As it was stated, the principle was applicable to any facts demonstrating physical damage to a person within the "neighbor" range of proximity.
58
The specific rule derived from this principle was that:
[A] manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends for it to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care. In the American Courts the law has advanced considerably in the development of the principle exemplified in Thomas v. Winchester. In one of the latest cases in the United States, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the plaintiff, who had purchased from a retailer a motor-car manufactured by the defendant company, was injured in consequence of a defect in the construction of the car, and was held entitled to recover damages from the manufacturer.
….
The prolonged discussion of English and American cases into which I have been led might well dispose your Lordships to think that I had forgotten that the present is a Scottish appeal which must be decided according to Scots law….
[But] I think it desirable to consider the matter from the point of view of the principles applicable to this branch of law which are admittedly common to both English and Scottish jurisprudence.
[ It is always a satisfaction to an English lawyer to be able to test his application of fundamental principles of the common law by the development of the same doctrines by the lawyers of the Courts of the United States. In that country I find that the law appears to be well established in the sense in which I have indicated. The mouse had emerged from the ginger-beer bottle in the United States before it appeared in Scotland, but there it brought a liability upon the manufacturer. I must not in this long judgment do more than refer to the illuminating judgment of Cardozo J. in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.in the New York Court of Appeals, in which he states the principles of the law as I should desire to state them, and reviews the authorities in other States than his own. Whether the principle he affirms would apply to the particular facts of that case in this country would be a question for consideration if the case arose. It might be that the course of business, by giving opportunities of examination to the immediate purchaser or otherwise, prevented the relation between manufacturer and the user of the car being so close as to create a duty. But the American decision would undoubtedly lead to a decision in favour of the pursuer in the present case. 
In Australia
MacPherson further managed to travel all the way to Australia around 1933.
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As is well known, English and Australian judges regularly exchanged commu- The New York Court of Appeals' development of the law of negligence may be seen through a handful of cases. One of them, MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. was referred to in Donoghue v Stevenson, and relied upon by Lord Atkin. It decided that a duty of care is owed by the manufacturer of a motor car to the driver and passengers against the risk of physical damage. 88 As one can see, the influence of MacPherson in Australia surpassed its influence in the United Kingdom. As we will show in the following section, however, things were quite different in continental Europe. 
In the civil law
As already mentioned, neither statutes nor court decisions ever recognized the concept of privity of contract in the civil law world. To the contrary, article 1382 of the 1804 French Civil Code (CCfr) provided for a general duty of care. 89 Even the more restrictive formulation of section 823 of the German Civil Code (BGB) did not call into question that principle, at least with respect to material damage resulting from injuries to property or physical integrity.
90
For a civil law jurist, it is therefore striking to learn of the privity of contract doctrine in the common law and the long lasting reluctance of this law to recognize a general tort of negligence. Unsurprisingly, In this case, the plaintiff suffered internal injuries caused by splinters of glass in the medicine she bought in its original packaging from a pharmacist. 95 Confirming the novelty and the uncertainty of products liability cases, she sued the manufacturer on two counts: she brought a tort claim, asserting liability of the manufacturer for negligence in the manufacturing process, and she also brought a claim for damages based on a contract of warranty between her and the manufacturer. 96 In the alternative, she claimed that the pharmacist impliedly assigned his warranty claim against the manufacturer. 97 With no hesitation, the court quickly dismissed the claims under contract law 98 but allowed the tort claim. As a matter of course, the general principles of liability based on negligence, as provided for in the German Civil Code (sections 823 to 853 BGB), were applied, and the court found no reason to refer to mechanisms and rules of contractual liability. More interestingly, the court also decided that since the plaintiff had established that the cause of the injury had occurred in the defendant's manufacturing plant, there was no need for her to prove how the glass splinters got into the bottle. 99 On this basis, the court went on to shift the full burden of proof to the manufacturer. It interpreted the section dealing with employer's liability (section 831 BGB) as requiring the manufacturer to prove that he had complied with his duties as an employer to carefully select, instruct, and supervise his employees in order to be exempted from liability to the ultimate consumer. 100 At the same time, the court established a high level of proof by determining that the manufacturer had to present evidence that showed compliance with the duty of "higher supervision. As is shown by the Brunnensalz case, even if MacPherson would have traveled to Germany, it would have arrived one year too late and its holding would have been irrelevant to German products liability law. By 1915, the Reichsgericht's judgment was almost thirty years ahead of products liability law in the United States, or at least in California with Escola.
103 It would therefore not be surprising to learn that the influence went instead from Germany to New York. Indeed, the Brunnensalz case presented facts that were instructive for the MacPherson case.
104
As we indicated above, it is well known that Judge Cardozo was a voracious reader of all sorts of European literature, including German law books. In The Nature of the Judicial Process alone, Judge Cardozo cited ten German books and encyclopedias.
105 Even more, when discussing the gaps in law that judges fill, he conceded that "[m]any of the gaps have been filled in the development of the common law by borrowing from other systems." 106 It would be quite amusing to learn that he knew about the Brunnensalz case. In fact it is not only possible, but also quite likely! As we admitted, however, we have found no evidence of this knowledge.
107
injury was set in the defendant's factory.'"); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (requiring defendant to produce "evidence to rebut the inference of negligence which arises upon the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur….").
103 See 150 P.2d at 440. 104 As mentioned, the plaintiff asserted two contract claims and one tort claim, the former being quickly disposed of by the Reichsgericht. Mr. MacPherson, on the other hand, only brought a tort claim, but before MacPherson, contract law (that is, privity of contract) was applied to the analysis of negligence as a limitation on a manufacturer's duty. Therefore, Judge Cardozo, like the Reichsgericht, had to make a choice on whether the claim should be limited by contract law. any correspondence shedding light on this matter led us to determine it was preferable not to review Judge Cardozo's correspondence prior to the writing of this article. See RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO, 3-4 (1997) (stating that Judge Lehman-Judge Cardozo's closest friend to whom he bequeathed all of his books, letters, and personal papers-refused to turn over Judge Cardozo's correspondence to his first biographer because Judge Cardozo "guarded jealously his personal privacy" and instead burned all the letters and personal papers in 1939).
In France
Faithful to its revolutionary ideals of the end of the eighteenth century, French law was even more generous than German law to victims of defective products. 108 For reasons that we will not discuss here, French law also provided victims of defective products with a direct contractual warranty claim against manufacturers (action directe) and later on imposed contractual strict liability against the seller derived from the obligation de sécurité.
109
As early as 1896, cases were brought on the basis of article 1384 CCfr, which became the basis of a general principle of strict liability for things (la responsabilité du fait des choses). In the famous 1896 Teffaine case, 110 a widow of a crewmember brought an action against the owner of a boiler that exploded because of its defective engine. The Cour de cassation found for the plaintiff although the owner of the boiler was not proven to have been negligent. The proof of a hidden defect (un vice occulte) was enough to trigger the keepers' liability. 111 In effect, it held that there is an inherent presumption of liability for harm caused by things in article 1384 paragraph 1 CCfr, separate from liability under article 1382 CCfr.
112
The 1930 Jand'heur decision took it even a step further. In this case, the victim hit by a delivery truck brought an action under article 1384 paragraph 1 CCfr against the owner of the delivery truck. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had to be responsible for the daughter's loss regardless of fault, whereas the defendant contended that strict liability for things did not apply when operated by its custodian (le gardien). The court had to decide whether article 1384 CCfr would apply to cars because the accidents resulted from the act of a thing or whether fault-based liability, as provided in article 1382 CCfr, would apply because the driver was operating the car, thus obliging the victim to establish the driver's fault. Unanimously, the Cour de cassation decided that, as the custodian of the car, the driver was liable for the accident he caused, whether or not the accident could be attributed to the conduct of the car's custodian-thus regardless of that person's fault. 113 As André Tunc once remarked, a pyramid had been built on the bars of a pinhead. 114 Indeed, the text of article 1384 CCfr could have been read either way, but the court was well aware that the growing number of automobile accidents that came with the rapid expansion of the automobile industry required an adaptation of the law.
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Although the Cour de cassation interpreted article 1384 paragraph 1 CCfr as applying to injuries caused by automobiles, the provision governs all objects. 116 Incidentally, this decision played a subsequent role in the development of the law of neighboring countries, such as Belgium and Italy. 117 Clearly, this case law also helped victims of defective products. The courts were able to impose strict liability on manufacturers on the basis that they were the keepers of the structure of their products. Keepers were held responsible for any harm caused by the product; absence of fault was not a viable defense. 118 Accordingly, and similar to Germany, an influence of MacPherson on French products liability law was inconceivable. 119 The French products liability law was in 1896 what U.S.
products liability law became in 1916 with MacPherson.
A brief outline of a possible comparative analysis
As shown above, the direct and explicit influence of MacPherson was limited to the common law world. In civil law jurisdictions, the MacPherson opinion served no purpose, as the doctrine of privity of contract had never seen the light of day. Yet in each law described in this article, we saw that contract law played a role.
In the common law prior to MacPherson, it was, as we saw, to dispose of the claims of victims of defective products against manufacturers with whom they had no contract. Under French law, as we briefly stated it, contract claims (action directe and obligation de sécurité), to the contrary, were a means of reinforcing the protection of such victims alongside with torts claims. Under German law, the role of contract was also raised. However, the Reichsgericht decided to leave aside contract claims possibly based on an assignment of rights to the victim, and they merely remained an unnecessary possibility for a plaintiff to justify a claim against a manufacturer. While the exact role played by contract law in the development of products liability law is undoubtedly very interesting, we will not explore this question here, as it would go beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we would like to briefly outline two points, which should also be the object of further investigations: the parallel outcomes triggered by tort law with respect to the protection of the victims of defective products in the common law and in the civil law only after 1916 (4.1), and the divergent paths taken in the developments of tort law following WWII (4.2)
Parallel outcomes after 1916
On the basis of the present analysis, MacPherson appears to have stated a rule that parallels the one already in place in the civil law when it was decided. As we saw, the rule there was in the books at the very moment of the adoption of the French and German codes in 1804 and 1900 respectively. For obvious reasons, it was only with the development of mass production and industrialization that case law began to show the potential of that law. A little before , it would certainly be worth exploring the common law world's resistance to change. This resistance that affected victims of defective products, however, changed after the mid-forties. These outlined parallel outcomes would justify a more detailed presentation. While concentrating on the law of products liability, such research could help shed more light on the grounds of liability in general. Indeed, it would be interesting to compare the different developments of the law of negligence and its relation to strict liability, as well as the role played by contract law in the common law 122 and the civil law. 123 The restrictive approach to the tort of negligence as well as the importance given to nominate torts in the common law in comparison to the approach in the civil law would be worth exploring and could help shed light on the different economic and philosophical differences that often exist between the two. A comparative study of the role of contract law with respect to that of tort would also help understand these differences.
124
120 See POLENBERG, supra note 107. 
Contrasting developments after WWII
As is well known, the reality of products liability laws changed after WWII. 125 Dramatic developments took place in the United States until the late 1990s. 126 Before the Restatement (Third) of Torts slowed things down, thousands of cases were litigated to shape the exact entitlements of the victims of defective products and define the different types of defectiveness. Products liability became a subject in its own right that lawyers practiced and scholars specialized in. The legal reality developed in a very different way in Europe. Indeed, the European Community decided in 1985 to adopt a Directive on Product Liability 127 modeled after the rules of Restatement (Second) of Torts. 128 However, even after its adoption, the importance of tort law as a means of compensating victims of defective products in Europe never came close to what it had become in the United States. 129 Early on, before the European Directive, products liability law in Europe left its preeminent place to the law of insurance. More specifically, the introduction of mandatory first party accident insurance schemes relegated the importance of tort law to less dramatic and more dispersed litigation between the first party insurer and the tortfeasor, leaving the victim that was often covered for the most part out of the litigation scene. In addition, Europeans tended to trust the state to pass regulations that defined safety requirements for a number of products. 130 Both the relative efficacy of these insurance schemes and the safety regulations again deflated the importance of tort law claims. Relatedly, U.S. procedural devices such as class actions or the contingent fee system were not implemented in Europe. 131 Again, it would go beyond the scope of this article to analyze these differences, but they certainly provide an interesting object of comparison for the respective role of tort law and products liability laws on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, in our opinion, it is clearly the case that unlike Americans, Europeans would not claim, in the same way, that lawsuits are good for them. 132 While legal services in Europe are also the object of a private market, they are an important part of the mission of the state. Whether future trade developments will allow these differences in culture and mentality to be preserved remains to be seen. Once again however, this is a story for another day.
Conclusion
The MacPherson decision liberated the common law of negligence in the United States from its traditional constraints, and it helped better protect the victims of defective products regardless of privity of contract. It made its way to other common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, where the same result was achieved.
MacPherson, however, never made its way to the civil law world. The reason is simple. Civil law jurisdictions did not need it, given that privity of contract had never seen the light of day there. As we showed, when products liability suits came up there in the late nineteenth century, the courts had no trouble upholding them on the basis of presumed negligence or even strict liability, thus going even beyond what MacPherson achieved. It is very probable that in 1916 Judge Cardozo knew of the recent case law in these countries, and hence quite possible that it played a role in shaping his opinion.
As suggested, it would be interesting to engage in a further comparative inquiry and to explore the question as to why the law developed the way it did on both sides of the Atlantic, before and after WWII. Indeed after the war, the common law-late in comparison to European developments-caught up and developed a sophisticated body of tort law. The Europeans took a different route, despite their adoption of the EC Directive on products liability in 1985, modeled after U.S. principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Unlike the United States, Europe adopted insurance schemes and safety regulations that tended to reduce the importance of the law of tort, specifically in the area of products. Here too, it would be interesting to explore the differences of approach taken on both sides of the Atlantic. To do justice to the respective approaches, we would have to provide an account of the cultural and political differences that determine the law. Undoubtedly, the contrasting role played by the state in the two cultures also would be an important point to grasp.
